The two faces of EU–NATO cooperation:Counter-piracy operations off the Somali coast by Smith, Simon & Gebhard, Carmen
        
Citation for published version:
Smith, S & Gebhard, C 2015, 'The two faces of EU–NATO cooperation: Counter-piracy operations off the Somali
coast', Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 107-127. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836714532917
DOI:
10.1177/0010836714532917
Publication date:
2015
Document Version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
Cooperation and Conflict
2015, Vol. 50(1) 107 –127
© The Author(s) 2014
Reprints and permissions: 
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0010836714532917
cac.sagepub.com
The two faces of EU–NATO 
cooperation: Counter-piracy 
operations off the Somali  
coast
Carmen Gebhard and Simon J Smith
Abstract
Maritime engagement in the Gulf of Aden is a puzzling case for anyone interested in the political 
and institutional problems underlying European Union–North Atlantic Treaty Organization (EU–
NATO) cooperation. Although the EU’s operation NAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ and NATO’s ‘Ocean 
Shield’ operate in the same theatre and with similar mandates, there is no formal link between 
them. No joint planning has been envisaged, and no official task-sharing takes place. As this article 
aims to show, cooperation and coordination between EU and NATO forces at the operational and 
tactical levels have nevertheless worked surprisingly well. Two faces of EU–NATO cooperation 
become apparent: the political level is dominated by a permanent deadlock, while on the ground 
and at sea staff have developed a modus operandi that allows them to deliver fairly successfully 
in complementing yet detached operations. Based on 60 interviews with EU and NATO officials 
(2010–2013), this article illustrates how the operational and tactical levels have developed ways 
of coordinating efforts informally despite the lack of a formal framework. It aims to show to what 
extent and how they succeed at bypassing organizational boundaries and at overcoming political 
limitations. Although these practices are becoming increasingly institutionalized, it remains to be 
seen whether this will translate into formal changes. 
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I know a lot of people often say that we are either competing or cooperating in counter-piracy. 
Actually, we are working alongside one another. We are more deconflicting than we are 
cooperating. We certainly are not integrating. (Interview with senior NATO official, August 
2010)
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Introduction
Although seaborne piracy is by no means a new phenomenon, it has become a more 
exigent challenge in recent years (see Bueger, 2013a). Incidents have been on the rise 
in many parts of the world, such as in the Caribbean, in East Asia, but most of all 
around the Horn of Africa. As from 2008, the Horn of Africa has seen a drastic surge 
in pirate attacks with numbers rising from eight attacks in 2007 to 61 in 2008, 76 in 
2009, 124 in 2010 to 176 in 2011 (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2012).1 
Exacerbated by the situation on land, with a lingering food crisis in Southern Somalia 
that has displaced a million people within a year, and continued fighting between 
Islamist insurgents and the transitional government, more than 40% of piracy cases 
reported globally between 2007 and 2012 took place in the waters off the Somali 
coast (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2013). Because of the importance of the 
Gulf of Aden as a major international trading route and strategic choke point, many 
nations have seen their economic and security political interests challenged in this 
context. Developments in recent years have led to comprehensive international 
engagement in the region, including a strong maritime presence with several multina-
tional contingents in place that are made up of military contributions by more than 30 
countries. Other than for its strategic importance, the maritime security situation 
around the Horn of Africa has received scholarly attention as a ‘laboratory for inter-
national military naval coordination’ (Helly, 2009: 399).
More specifically, the region has become a focal area for the study of the relationship 
between the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
Maritime engagement in the Gulf of Aden is a puzzling recent case for anyone interested 
in the political and institutional problems underlying EU–NATO cooperation, a topic 
that has already generated a vast literature (e.g. Brimmer, 2002; Burwell et al., 2006; 
Drozdiak, 2010; Græger and Haugevik, 2011; Hofmann, 2011; Howorth, 2003, 2009; 
Howorth and Keeler, 2003; Hunter, 2000; Kramer and Serfaty, 2007; Valasek, 2007; 
Varwick and Koops, 2009). Since late 2008, both organizations have conducted counter-
piracy operations off the Somali coast to reinstall stability in the region and to reduce the 
number and frequency of disruptions to international shipping routes, interestingly, with-
out having any formal political framework for cooperation. Although the EU’s maritime 
operation NAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ and NATO’s operation ‘Ocean Shield’ (following its 
precedent NATO ‘Allied Protector’) operate in the same theatre and with similar man-
dates, there is no formal link between them. The two operations also run outside the so-
called Berlin Plus framework, that is, outside the agreements that were put into place in 
2002 to formally regulate both strategic and operational cooperation between the EU and 
NATO, including intelligence cooperation and the exchange of information. Member 
states of the EU and NATO have been unable to agree on the political relationship 
between the two organizations in a way that would allow for joint operational effort and 
sound strategic cooperation, let alone for a unity of command in this important matter. 
No joint planning has been envisaged, neither before nor after any of the operations were 
deployed. Furthermore, although both organizations have operations in the same mission 
space, no official task-sharing takes place between NATO and the EU, and there is no 
intended or formal functional and strategic complementarity of actions.
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Given these particular circumstances, counter-piracy off the Somali coast holds a lot 
of potential to serve as an exemplar for analysing the politics underlying the institutional, 
inter-organizational and political relationship between the EU’s Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) and NATO. That said, research on the operational realities in this 
context and the way these are affected by this particular relationship between the EU and 
NATO has remained limited (except for, for example, Muratore, 2010; Seibert, 2009; 
Smith, 2011). So far, the literature has focused more on the strategic foundations of mul-
tinational counter-piracy operations in this region (e.g. Bueger et al., 2011; Chalk, 2010; 
Germond and Smith, 2009; Willett, 2011) as well as on the international legal framework 
for operational action in this area (e.g. Bueger, 2013b; Geiss and Petrig, 2011; Roach, 
2010). This article seeks to contribute to closing this gap by illustrating how limitations 
at the political and strategic levels affect and condition working reality at the operational 
and tactical levels within both organizations. Two faces of EU–NATO cooperation 
become apparent: the political level is dominated by a permanent deadlock, while on the 
ground and at sea staff within both organizations have developed a modus operandi that 
allows them to deliver fairly successfully in complementing yet detached operations.2
The two faces of EU–NATO cooperation: political deadlock 
versus pragmatism
The international maritime presence off the Somali coast serves as a prime example 
for the underlying logic of inter-organizational cooperation in the realm of multilat-
eral security and conflict resolution. Apart from being resource driven and focusing 
on minimizing and pooling efforts, international security organizations such as NATO 
and the EU through its CSDP are dependent on the purposive choices of their member 
states – and so is any cooperation between them. The case of EU–NATO cooperation 
in this specific regional context reflects much of the general debate about the relation-
ship between these two organizations and their cooperation in operations more spe-
cifically (see Bilgin, 2003; Mace, 2004; Messervy-Whiting, 2005; Michel, 2007; 
Missiroli, 2002; Reichard, 2004; Riggio, 2003; Smith, 2011). A lot of this political 
debate is focused on aspects of duplication, competition and rivalry (e.g. Biermann, 
2008; Cornish, 2006; Duke, 2008; Mayer, 2011; Ojanen, 2006; Thulstrup, 2010), 
which are issues that have divided the transatlantic security regime for many years. 
The question as to how the security-relevant aspects of the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) would relate to any existing arrangements within the 
framework of the Western European Union (WEU) or NATO long dominated much of 
the discussions on the potential scope of any such policy. Another recurring dispute 
concerns whether or not the EU should acquire its own autonomous operational head-
quarters (OHQ); a structure that has
…been denied to the EU/ESDP for years owing to disputes over the division of labour between 
the EU and NATO, which partly resulted from American reluctance to support the creation of 
independent EU military capabilities (that is, the US preference for ‘no duplication’ of NATO’s 
capabilities, including planning and operational headquarters, within the EU). (Germond and 
Smith, 2009)
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Atlanticists within the EU, the United Kingdom in particular, have sought to retain the 
exclusive primacy of NATO as a security framework whereas Europeanists, and first of 
all France, have been inclined to promote a strong and autonomous EU security and 
defence policy. However, the debate has since moved beyond these two positions, and 
there seems to be more of a general consensus that the CSDP and NATO can usefully 
complement each other. Therefore, the two organizations are pressed more than ever to 
develop ways to cooperate, particularly when they operate in the same mission space.
This article holds that formal non-cooperation of the two organizations, as can be seen 
in the case of counter-piracy, is not primarily a matter of inter-organizational competition 
or rivalry, as has been argued prominently (see e.g. Seibert, 2009). It is more about the 
way organizational fora are used by member states as a means to maximize specific 
national interests. Most NATO members are EU member states, and most EU member 
states are either members of NATO or have signed a security agreement with the alliance 
in the framework of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Despite greatly overlapping member-
ship structures and a common history of increasing strategic and normative convergence, 
however, formal political unity between the two organizations has been hard to attain.
Shortly before CSDP became operational in 2003, the Berlin Plus agreements were put 
into place to provide a formal political, institutional and operational framework for coop-
eration between the EU and NATO. When these arrangements were to become operation-
alized for the first time in the context of the EU Operation ‘Concordia’ (March–December 
2003), the first military CSDP operation, they were hailed as a milestone in developing a 
strategic partnership between the two organizations. The arrangements, however, were 
preceded by fierce political struggles over the way CSDP should relate to NATO, and to 
what extent it should be given the capabilities to act independently of NATO. One of the 
key protagonists in this debate has been Turkey, which in the face of CSDP inception 
developed serious concerns over becoming marginalized as a non-EU member and thus 
third state.3 To eventually attain Turkey’s consent, the arrangements had to be defined 
more narrowly to exclude the involvement of any (future) EU member state that had no 
security arrangement with NATO, which was first and foremost pointing at Cyprus. The 
EU accession of Cyprus therefore complicated the picture dramatically.4 NATO member 
Turkey has since continued to block any attempt at establishing stronger formal coopera-
tive ties between the alliance and the EU, mainly by denying Cypriot (and until 2008, 
Maltese)5 participation in EU–NATO meetings – a situation that is commonly referred to 
as the ‘participation problem’. What is more, as a non-NATO and non-PfP member, 
Cyprus has in turn used her stance as an EU member state to marginalize Turkey by block-
ing cooperation between the EU and Turkey from within the EU, such as in the context of 
Turkey’s involvement in the European Defence Agency (EDA).
The Berlin Plus agreements through which the EU is granted access to NATO assets 
and capabilities, in particular NATO’s strategic command for operations, the Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE),6 have since only served as a formal 
framework for EU–NATO cooperation once, namely in the case of EUFOR ‘Althea’ 
(ongoing since December 2004). To comply with Turkey’s conditions, however, this 
arrangement excludes Cyprus from all formal EU–NATO communication: most cru-
cially from meetings at the ambassadorial level, that is, between the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) of the EU and NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC). The two 
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organizations can only formally communicate and cooperate within the Berlin Plus 
framework – and only Berlin Plus matters can be discussed. As a result, institutional red 
lines, particularly with regard to the passing of sensitive information, are very present in 
the relationship between the two organizations whenever Berlin Plus is not used as a 
formally agreed framework as is the case with counter-piracy.7
For focus regions such as the Horn of Africa, this means that the ability of NATO and 
the EU to cooperate effectively is conditioned by the political agenda of a small group of 
member states. Apart from benefitting from the functional consequences of their EU or 
NATO membership, Turkey and Cyprus (often backed by Greece) use their institutional 
affiliations to pursue their national interests in a very definitive fashion. Leaders within 
both organizations seem to be unable, and to some extent unwilling, to remove this 
organizational disconnect. As will be shown in this article, this situation has wide- 
ranging implications for the organizational reality in common mission areas such as the 
Horn of Africa: international and seconded staff within each organization have to com-
pensate for the lack of a formal framework for cooperation, and are bound to operate 
within the artificial red lines imposed by the highest levels while trying to limit collateral 
damage, that is, casualties, material costs of non-cooperation but also operational effec-
tiveness more generally. Based on 60 interviews with EU and NATO officials (2010–
2011), this article illustrates how the operational and tactical levels have developed ways 
of coordinating efforts informally despite the lack of a political framework. It aims to 
show to what extent and how organizational actors thereby succeed at bypassing organi-
zational boundaries and overcoming political limitations to carry out their mandate. It 
discusses the question to what degree these practices have become institutionalized and 
whether they have the potential to trigger formal change in the relationship between the 
two organizations.
The next section gives an overview of the operational background and mandates of 
‘Atalanta’ and ‘Ocean Shield’, and briefly discusses other international counter-piracy 
engagement in the area. The article then turns to the specific mission setup including the 
organizational structures within both the EU and NATO and the institutional set of inter-
organizational rules that determines the institutional red lines of EU–NATO cooperation. 
The third section analyses the way the ‘participation problem’ is becoming institutional-
ized in the mission space, that is, the way it is translated into organizational practices at 
the operational and the tactical levels. The article will conclude by linking back to the 
notion of inter-organizational cooperation not only being resource driven, as the duplica-
tion and competition debate about the EU and NATO would suggest (e.g. Cornish, 2006; 
Duke, 2008). It is instead heavily dominated, if not determined, by state interests and 
national agendas, particularly when it comes to formal institutional developments. 
Pragmatic and informal arrangements in turn seem to override the dominating role of 
state interests, which leads to more flexibility and functionality but does not, in the long 
run, compensate for the lack of formal arrangements nor likely trigger any changes.
Detached operations with similar mandates
The concurrent maritime engagement of the EU and NATO off the Somali coast since 
late 2008 was first hailed as a potential showcase for how the two organizations could 
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ideally complement each other. The situation started out with what seemed to be clear 
and effective task-sharing between two diverse yet complementary security organiza-
tions. After the UN Security Council had adopted a set of resolutions to enable interna-
tional action against piracy off the Somali coast (resolutions 1814, 1816, 1851) in 2008, 
NATO launched ‘Allied Provider’ in October of the same year using one of its maritime 
immediate reaction forces, Standing Naval Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2), which hap-
pened to be operating in this part of the world at the time. In fact, NATO’s ‘Allied 
Provider’ was designed and intended as a short-term operation pending the establishment 
of an autonomous EU maritime operation, EU NAVFOR ‘Atalanta’, which was launched 
successively in December 2008. NATO and the EU seemed to perfectly complement 
each other with this sequence of operations. The EU, however, did not formally take over 
from NATO. The deployment of SNMG2 had been scheduled to end in December 2008 
in any case, as the ships were due to return to their original operating area in the 
Mediterranean. The withdrawal of SNMG2 in December 2008 only happened to coin-
cide with the point at which the EU operation was launched. ‘In the end, there was a 
useful degree of continuity with the counter-piracy effort effectively passing from NATO 
to the EU, but it had not been formally planned that way’ (House of Lords, 2010: 1). At 
the time, there was no declared intention of any further involvement of NATO in the 
region. In March 2009, however, NATO announced a follow-up mission, operation 
‘Allied Protector’, just about when the EU considered extending ‘Atalanta’ until 
December 2009.
This turned the purported model case for EU–NATO task-sharing and complementa-
rity into what could be seen as a prime example of strategic overlap and, potentially, 
duplication. Today, the two organizations are deployed in the same region with similar 
mandates: both NATO and EU operations focus on deterrence, prevention and repression 
of acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.8 They also both engage in the protection of 
vulnerable vessels where NAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ has taken on a specific yet not exclusive 
focus on vessels chartered by the World Food Programme (WFP) and ships that provide 
logistical support to the African Union (AU) operation AMISOM.9 Since August 2009, 
the mandate of NATO ‘Ocean Shield’ formally includes capacity-building aspects and 
the training of local and regional authorities in Somalia – elements that NAVFOR 
‘Atalanta’ did not formally include until recently. In July 2012, however, the Council of 
the EU announced the imminent launch of a new civilian CSDP operation, EUCAP (n.d.) 
‘Nestor’ (Regional Maritime Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and the Western 
Indian Ocean), to complement counter-piracy efforts through training, rule of law and 
capacity-building measures on land (European Union External Action Service, 2012).
In terms of capabilities, NAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ is the more resourced operation, pro-
viding six warships (10–12 in 2012) as well as a number of Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
(MPA) (EU NAVFOR Somalia, 2013) while at the time of writing, in July 2013, NATO 
contributes only three warships (five in 2012) (NATO Live, 2013). Also, while NATO’s 
mandate is broader on paper, the EU has a more evolved portfolio as a comprehensive 
security provider, including financial and political instruments as well as a solid set of 
legal arrangements with adjacent states (see Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011). 
This finds confirmation not least in the capacity-building and training missions the EU 
has launched in support of its military engagement at sea, such as in the context of 
 at University of Bath - The Library on November 2, 2015cac.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Gebhard and Smith 113
EUPM Somalia, of EUCAP ‘Nestor’, and its development and economic cooperation 
programmes.
In the case of counter-piracy operations off the Somali coast, it is particularly 
important to discuss EU–NATO cooperation against the background of other interna-
tional maritime engagement in the area. Since 2002, the US-led Combined Maritime 
Forces (CMF), a maritime coalition of the willing, has been present in the region, 
focusing on maritime security in general but particularly on counter-terrorism opera-
tions at sea. Since 2009, CMF has also assumed counter-piracy tasks deploying either 
Combined Task Force (CTF)-151 or CTF-150. Alongside CMF, there is a number of 
independent deployers, such as China, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, 
Kenya, Malaysia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Yemen, which commit naval 
assets to counter-piracy efforts without joining any of the multinational coalition oper-
ations, that is, ‘Ocean Shield’, ‘Atalanta’ or CMF. This international context condi-
tions EU–NATO cooperation in an important way: any EU–NATO issue can be framed 
as part of the multinational maritime efforts in the region, which not only depoliticizes 
many aspects of cooperation but also facilitates the exchange of information and opens 
up opportunities for coordination, which would be hard to attain in the formal EU–
NATO context. As will be shown in this article, EU–NATO cooperation at the opera-
tional and tactical levels profits greatly from the involvement in multinational 
coordination mechanisms that have a pragmatic focus on joint operational efforts 
rather than on political sensitivities within or between any of the coalitions involved. 
Apart from being most apparent at the operational and tactical levels, this is being 
acknowledged by staff within both the EU and NATO and even taken advantage of in 
order to facilitate closer cooperation.
The institutional framework of EU–NATO cooperation in 
counter-piracy
EU NAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ and NATO’s operation ‘Ocean Shield’ operate alongside each 
other with no formal links between the chains of command or at the organization-to-
organization level. Given their very similar mandates, there is a unity of effort and ambi-
tion between the two organizations but formally no unity of command. There are two 
independent non-integrated chains of command with each a very different hierarchical 
nature and organizational logic.10 Levels in one structure are not mirrored in the other, 
which means that docking mechanisms are problematic. Recent reorganization of EU 
structures in the context of the European External Action Service (EEAS) has exacer-
bated the problem of institutional incompatibility to the point where institutional actors 
within NATO were no longer sure of their organizational counterparts within the EU 
(interview with senior NATO official at HQ Operations, April 2011).
At the highest levels within each organization, the Secretary General of NATO and 
the EU High Representative (HR) play important political roles although their institu-
tional impact on the state of EU–NATO cooperation remains limited. Javier Solana, who 
acted in these positions consecutively (1995–1999 and 1999–2009), has repeatedly 
advocated a closer and more flexible relationship between the two organizations. 
Secretary General Rasmussen and HR Ashton have since also pushed for closer 
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cooperation, and highlighted the need for developing a way of working together more 
effectively, particularly in common areas of operation. These declarations of intent, how-
ever, are commonly accompanied by references to ‘what is possible’ and the ‘political 
limitations’ of cooperation. The underlying limitations are very clearly affecting the 
political and strategic levels of the two chains of command: the EU’s PSC and NATO’s 
NAC, which are made up of member state political and ambassadorial representatives, 
cannot meet outside the Berlin Plus framework to discuss ongoing operations or strategic 
direction of mutual concern.11
Both the EU and NATO have their OHQs based at Northwood, which also hosts the 
British Royal Navy compound. They are, however, co-located and thus distinct struc-
tures with no formal arrangements for interaction. SHAPE, NATO’s strategic command 
for operations in Mons, plays no official role in the context of this particular case. Its 
planning facilities are not used as an OHQ under the political guidance and strategic 
control of the PSC, as would be the case in a Berlin Plus type cooperation setup. The 
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) nevertheless plays a crucial 
role in the relationship between the two organizations, and constitutes an important point 
of contact for the EU’s Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), which is 
in charge of political-strategic planning of all CSDP operations. Permanent military liai-
son arrangements that were put into place to facilitate contact between the two organiza-
tions as a result of the implementation of Berlin Plus, that is, the EU Cell that was 
installed at SHAPE to complement the NATO permanent liaison team at the European 
Union Military Committee (EUMC), were instead hardly involved in operational matters 
related to counter-piracy (interview with official at EEAS/SHAPE, October 2010). The 
following section looks at how this formal disconnect is reflected in a lack of functional 
arrangements for communication and the sharing of information and intelligence.
Institutional limitations and red lines
While it is less clear whether the concurrent but detached deployment of NATO and EU 
maritime forces in the region actually constitutes a duplication of efforts, the problem 
remains that there is no inter-organizational arrangement in place for communication, 
cooperation or command and control.12 This results in a number of institutional limita-
tions. Firstly, as the security agreements for the passing of sensitive information do not 
extend to Cyprus, communication and information systems (CIS) infrastructure cannot 
be shared between the two operations. Secondly, contributing nations to either side are 
forced to enter bilateral arrangements. Forces mandated to support one operation and not 
the other have difficulty sharing intelligence between operations; even nations involved 
in both but ‘favouring’ one over the other inevitably give tasking priority to that 
operation.13
The passing of sensitive information and the exchange of relevant intelligence 
across organizational boundaries is in fact the most challenging problem that the EU 
and NATO have to surmount when cooperating in a non-Berlin Plus setting.14 In a situ-
ation where Berlin Plus is used as a framework, a restricted (classified) NATO docu-
ment can only be sent to EU member states that have signed security agreements with 
NATO, which excludes Cyprus. Outside this framework, NATO staff recognizes that 
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any operational issues would be dealt with at the level of the EU 27 including Cyprus, 
which is why they will not pass on the document to their EU staff counterpart in the 
first place. What further complicates the situation is that all documents that are under 
the control of the originator, even, for example, non-classified NATO documents, are 
held back as these too would be released to all EU 27 member states. Two international 
organizations with 21 coinciding members operating in a common mission area and 
combating a common threat are kept from sharing intelligence and exchanging infor-
mation even if it serves shared interests. When asked about this situation, one EU 
official responded: ‘in many ways there is nothing that we would not want to share. 
But our hands are bound by documents that have been written 5, 10, 15 years ago’ 
(interview with EU official at Northwood OHQ, April 2010).
In the absence of a formal framework for cooperation, and crucially, for the sharing 
of information and the exchange of intelligence, a ‘sharing of information agreement’ 
on EU Classified Information (EUCI) that is external to the provisions of Berlin Plus 
was first devised unilaterally within ‘Atalanta’. Crucially, this agreement was given 
consent by the PSC, based on the consideration that the absence of such an arrange-
ment would be ‘binding what “Atalanta” could and could not do’ (interview with EU 
official at Northwood OHQ, April 2010). This EU document has later been mirrored 
by a NATO agreement on the sharing of information. Taken together, these agreements 
are aimed at regulating different levels of classification, or what is deemed intelli-
gence. They limit the exchange of information by, for example, allowing the passing of 
photographs from one organization to the other, but not the analysis of those pictures 
and any intelligence that may or may not stem from them.15 The EU and NATO may 
share pictures with each other, but based on their shared interest in pursuing very simi-
lar mandates and avoiding a duplication of efforts, they would need to be able to share 
the analysis with each other as well.
These restrictions are somewhat eased by the fact that there are 21 coinciding member 
states, and that the forces are able to access their respective NATO or EU information/
computer systems. Intelligence has to be de-classified, however, before it can be passed 
across to the other system manually because the information/computer systems are com-
pletely separate – a situation that ‘does cause real frictions and real difficulties’ (inter-
view with senior NATO official at SHAPE, August 2010). The physical proximity of the 
two OHQs in Northwood also provides practical advantages as briefings can be held that 
can be attended by both EU and NATO staff. However, these institutional red lines 
remain a constant source of frustration at the operational level.
Moreover, the sharing of intelligence has ramifications beyond merely coordinating 
and deconflicting in areas of operations. Many personnel at the operational level pointed 
out in the interviews that cooperation and the sharing of intelligence is needed for other 
areas as well, most notably, when pursuing a comprehensive approach in crisis manage-
ment. As one interviewee put it ‘what we want to do is get suspects in a court and in front 
of a judge and the only way to do that is by sharing information’ (interview with EU 
official at Northwood OHQ, April 2010). However, even this seemingly uncontroversial 
ambition appears to cause problems at the political level. There is clear evidence that in 
reaction to these political limitations but mainly out of operational necessity, the existing 
rules are often stretched ‘beyond what those agreements are and how they are literally 
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read’, which is also not unknown to the political actors at higher levels within both 
organizations. There obviously is an ambition at the operational level to ‘make things 
work’, which comes, however, with the kind of determination that accepts that not all 
actions are within ‘the rules and regulations that currently exist’ (interview with EU offi-
cial at Northwood OHQ, April 2010).
The commanders have developed very clever ways because they cannot have formal discussions 
or cooperation through official channels. So, do you know what they were using? Yahoo 
Messenger. I am talking about the commanders at sea. It is ridiculous but we can’t see it and it 
is informal. (Interview with Cypriot Official to the PSC, April 2011)
Informal cooperation and the institutionalization of the 
‘participation problem’
The institutional deadlock that results from the blockage at the political level has serious 
implications for the way the EU and NATO can cooperate in a common mission space, 
particularly as there are no formal agreements in place. International staff in the area of 
operations and in Brussels have to find ways to make cooperation work regardless of 
these limitations. There is strong empirical evidence that international personnel within 
both organizations have been very keen to develop informal practices to facilitate coor-
dination, information exchange and deconfliction, and to embark on avenues of interac-
tion outside the straightjacket of formal EU–NATO relations. On the one hand, many 
staff proactively seek to find ways to circumvent the institutional impasse, for example, 
by framing cooperation as a multinational rather than an inter-organizational issue or by 
keeping coordination and cooperation efforts at the operational and tactical levels and 
thus away from politics at higher levels. On the other hand, many staff also show readi-
ness to challenge the organizational red lines imposed by existing arrangements, and 
push political actors for more pragmatism and institutional flexibility.16 This ‘bottom-up 
pressure’ can to a large degree be attributed to the sheer ‘operational necessity’ of making 
the relationship work in practice (Interview with NATO Official at Northwood OHQ, 
April 2010).17 The threat arising from the piracy problem is real, and so is the interna-
tional sense of responsibility of dealing with the issue effectively and on a cooperative 
basis. Top-down developments, such as decisions within the PSC, are often triggered by 
pressure coming from the operational level.18
The office of the DSACEUR and its relationship with CMPD are an interesting, 
unique and non-linear avenue for cooperation between the two organizations. According 
to one international staffer at NATO, ‘through the DSACEUR is where the real business 
is being done, for both formal Berlin Plus and, importantly, non-Berlin Plus operations. 
He keeps the dual hat to discuss even non-Berlin Plus issues’ (interview with interna-
tional staff official at NATO HQ Brussels, September 2010).19 However, the interlocutor 
was also quite adamant that this was not the proper docking mechanism for a robust 
institutional relationship, even for informal EU–NATO cooperation. ‘There should be 
meetings with the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations and the head of 
CMPD, but these meetings are stale and she [the head of CMPD] will only meet with the 
DSACEUR to discuss real business’ (interview with international staff official at NATO 
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HQ Brussels, September 2010). Interviews revealed that meetings between the office of 
the DSACEUR and that of the CMPD occur on a regular basis. DSACEUR staff are very 
keen to help facilitate EU–NATO cooperation in all areas, but particularly where the two 
organizations are deployed in the same mission area. Furthermore, there is also an atti-
tude in the office of the DSACEUR that the relationship with the CMPD and other EU/
CSDP institutions was vital for the enhancement of EU–NATO cooperation in operations 
that are not formally connected and for helping to overcome sub-optimal performance in 
such cases.20
An opaque framework masked by the international and 
maritime milieu
EU–NATO cooperation benefits greatly from the multinational context of counter-piracy 
in the region. Given that another coalition, the US-led CMF, operates in the region along 
with other independent deployers, the relationship between the two organizations often 
gets conveniently diffused at the operational and tactical levels. Before ‘Atalanta’ was 
launched in late 2008, throughout 2007 and 2008 several European states (France, 
Denmark and the Netherlands, along with Canada) had already been engaged in counter-
piracy action. In September 2008, a Naval Coordination Cell (NAVCO) was created 
under the auspices of the EU to facilitate cooperation among several parties present in 
the area, including EU and NATO forces as well as third actors (Council of the European 
Union, 2008). The purpose was to enhance coordination and cooperation for a shared 
objective, based on the scope of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 
1816. The activities of NAVCO were later integrated into ‘Atalanta’.
One of the most important frameworks for coordination and cooperation between EU 
and NATO staff and representatives of other actors in the area of operations established 
since is the so-called Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) Group, which 
meets at the tactical level and includes representatives of the maritime industry. Since 
late 2008, CMF has organized SHADE coordination meetings in Bahrain every eight 
weeks, which involve all fleets operating in the region. The meetings are co-chaired by a 
permanent CMF chair and a rotational EU or NATO chair, and focus almost exclusively 
on technical matters at the tactical level. For EU and NATO staff, these meetings offer a 
welcome opportunity to deconflict and coordinate actions and exchange best practices in 
a multinational context that involves other actors and, thus, keeps the political problems 
of EU–NATO cooperation at a distance. Interestingly, the chair of SHADE is deliberately 
kept to the level of Colonel or Commander to keep ‘politics out’ (interview with NATO 
official at Northwood OHQ, April 2010). EU and NATO staff ‘work hard on’ retaining 
this multinational format as it is geared towards developing a common understanding 
and enabling the coordination of ‘planning and operations’ (interview with NATO offi-
cial at Northwood OHQ, April 2010).
One of SHADE’s most important achievements to date was the establishment of the 
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) in the Gulf of Aden. Given the 
sheer size of the area to be secured, the group agreed on establishing recommended ship-
ping lanes based on shared information about operational experiences in the region. 
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There is still the wider Indian Ocean as well as the Somali Basin, but the IRTC has been 
effective in at least limiting piracy within the Gulf itself. It not only reduces the size of 
the area of operations but also allows for more concerted task-sharing between the three 
multinational deployments: the position of an IRTC coordinator, which rotates among 
the CMF, the EU and NATO, has been created to ensure tactical coordination. This trilat-
eral arrangement builds on the IRTC Coordination Guide, a gentlemen’s agreement to 
keep the number of ships per area within the IRTC to a minimum: eight to ten vessels 
ensure good coverage of the IRTC at a time. To make this work, intense coordination 
efforts are needed, which have so far been very successful.21 Notwithstanding the indi-
vidual mandates of each organization, NATO to detour and disrupt piracy, CMF doing 
the same plus other national objectives and counter-terrorism, and the EU’s specific 
commitment to the WFP, they all still provide two ships to the IRTC. ‘The IRTC is the 
highest priority for everybody’ not least because the problem can only be tackled with 
the help of all multinational and independent deployers. Despite an overall awareness of 
the need of keeping all parties engaged in a cooperative manner, it ‘does not mean that 
coordination is always easy or achieved’ (interview with NATO official at Northwood 
OHQ, April 2010).
Besides the achievements of multinational coordination and deconfliction with regard 
to the IRTC, there have also been attempts to achieve this in the Somali Basin where the 
specific challenge lies in keeping pirates from getting off the beach and reaching out into 
the Gulf. Cooperation in this respect, however, has not been institutionalized for as long. 
In response to some unsuccessful attempts at cooperating, resulting in ‘quite a few 
pirated ships in the Somali Basin’, starting in Spring 2010, the EU and NATO organized 
meetings involving the CMF to ‘hammer out what was needed to make it work’. These 
efforts have led to ‘excellent coordination between the EU and NATO (and CMF) in 
order to resolve the issue of pirates getting off the shore of Somalia and into the wider 
Basin’ (interview with NATO official at Northwood OHQ, April 2010). Like coordina-
tion for the IRTC, in this case too, it also builds on a gentlemen’s agreement to facilitate 
progress: coordination is based on a six-month rotation, and both organizations as well 
as CMF agreed to deploy forces in the Somali Basin.
Another example of pragmatism and ingenuity at the operational level is the shared 
use of two innovative information and communication systems among the forces 
deployed in the fight against piracy. The first is known as the Maritime Security Centre 
– Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA). Established by EU NAVFOR in close cooperation with 
the maritime industry, MSC-HOA provides ‘24 hour manned monitoring of vessels 
transiting through the Gulf of Aden whilst the provision of an interactive [public] web-
site enables the Centre to communicate the latest anti-piracy guidance to industry and for 
Shipping Companies and operators to register their movements through the region’ 
(MSC-HOA webpage). The second system, MERCURY, is even more crucial to multi-
national and inter-organizational cooperation in the area of counter-piracy. This secure 
but unclassified internet-based communication system, which has been initiated by the 
British and facilitated within SHADE, works as a ‘neutral communications channel’ and 
‘allows all SHADE participants to coordinate together in real time’ (EU NAVFOR 
Somalia, 2009). ‘Because NATO systems won’t talk to EU ones and vice versa, and then 
when you bring in all the independent deployers, you can’t talk to them. So again, we 
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have found innovative ways [MERCURY] to talk to each other’ (interview with EU 
official at Northwood OHQ, April 2010).
Multinational cooperation and deconfliction also occurs with the MPA element of 
operations.22 Working out of a cell in Bahrain, all operating forces in the region coordi-
nate their actions with the EU, NATO and CMF taking the lead on a rotational basis. 
NATO had no MPAs in operation during the first three years but still took part in the 
coordination. The exact number of the EU’s MPAs in the region is not confirmed, but 
their patrolling activity provides a crucial added value to other actors in the area of 
operations, which includes not only NATO and the CMF but also independent deploy-
ers.23 The MPA cell in Bahrain serves as a useful hub between EU and NATO forces 
while embedding this cooperation in a wider multinational context. Reportedly, EU and 
NATO liaison officers ‘who sit in on all the various briefings’ are the drivers behind 
much of the MPA deployments (interview with NATO official at Northwood, April 
2010).
Unity of effort without unity of command
EU–NATO cooperation in combating piracy generally benefits from the unique culture 
and operating procedures in maritime operations. There is a long tradition of multina-
tional maritime cooperation ‘that goes far back in history’ (interview with NATO official 
at Northwood OHQ, April 2010), not least including the tradition of ‘ship-to-ship’ coop-
eration that transcends any political boundaries and limitations at the tactical level. 
Further advantages arise more specifically from the fact that the two OHQ of ‘Ocean 
Shield’ and ‘Atalanta’ are situated at Northwood. Their co-location has facilitated infor-
mal EU–NATO cooperation in the face of political obstruction to the extent that some 
officers even see this practical situation as a condition sine qua non for the success of 
these operations:
…if NATO had not been here or the EU OHQ had not have been placed here, I have no doubt 
that we would still have a relationship but would it be as close as it is now? And I think that the 
ability to walk across the road has made a huge difference. (Interview with EU official at 
Northwood OHQ, April 2010)
Northwood, not least because of its proximity to London as an important hub for the 
international maritime community, has become a ‘fusion centre’ for the exchange of 
sensitive information across organizational boundaries. There have also been deliberate 
attempts to institutionalize cooperation at Northwood. A NATO officer described the 
practices whereby liaison officers of both organizations commonly ‘sit in on all the vari-
ous briefings. You have a Joint Collection Management Board (JCMB), which is to agree 
on intelligence, what should be the focus area and what is needed’ (interview with NATO 
official at Northwood OHQ, April 2010).24 When asked about the increasing institution-
alization of informal cooperation, an official at the OHQ of ‘Atalanta’ replied:
We must keep it at the tactical and operational level. A lot comes down to personalities and I 
think we have a good relationship between the liaison officers. Now, obviously that is then 
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caught by the institutional issues of classified information. (Interview with EU official at 
Northwood OHQ, April 2010)
While differences in the bureaucratic cultures by virtue of their history and capabili-
ties persist as much as their different institutional instincts, there are also very strong 
affinities between the two organizations. ‘They are used to working with other nations 
and doing things together’ (interview with NATO official at Northwood OHQ, April 
2010); unlike other deployers such as China, they have a routine of engaging in multina-
tional operations. Looking at the way the two organizations relate to and cooperate with 
independent deployers in the same area of operations helps to contextualize and bench-
mark the practical relationship between the EU and NATO.
If you look at the specific example of China, it would be a first for them participating in an 
operation where there is a fear of loss of face and fear something could go wrong on their 
watch. Of course as for Russia and India as well, there are also political considerations. 
(Interview with NATO official at Northwood OHQ, April 2010)
A reality that puts EU–NATO cooperation into context in this regard is the fact that 
there are 21 coinciding member states, which comes with a unique level of trust across 
organizational boundaries. In fact, all EU contributors to ‘Atalanta’ are also members of 
NATO, which has a very positive impact on relations in the mission area. Not only does 
it mean that personnel are transferring between organizations or are even double-hatted, 
but that there also exists a common understanding and culture at the political and opera-
tional level, which is reflected in informal practices of cooperation. Furthermore, 
although these are detached operations with two independent, that is, non-integrated 
chains of command, they are not operated by different navies. There is only one set of 
forces for each nation state, regardless of whether they are attached to NATO or the EU. 
Many officers and assets within either ‘Atalanta’ or ‘Ocean Shield’ have at one time been 
attached to the other parent organization. ‘Even more important than the close proximity 
of the OHQs, is the fact that we already knew each other very well before we started’ 
(interview with NATO official at Northwood OHQ, April 2010). The interchange rate of 
personnel between the EU and NATO is part of what accounts for a common culture 
between these two organizations, a culture that is qualitatively different from the rela-
tions of each of them with other partners in the area.
Conclusions
Cooperation and coordination between the EU and NATO forces in counter-piracy have 
so far worked surprisingly well despite the lack of a formal agreement. EU and NATO 
staff seem to have established effective mechanisms of informal cooperation and infor-
mation exchange. There is a keen awareness and resolve by staff in both organizations to 
keep as much of EU–NATO interaction as possible at the operational and tactical levels. 
The issue of limitations to cooperation is something that both EU and NATO personnel 
take seriously, while the operational level within ‘Atalanta’ – because of the nature of the 
EU’s chain of command – seems to be particularly successful in its attempts to push the 
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political level to enable cooperation and at least tolerate the informal crossing of red 
lines. Functionality, however, has expanded on both sides despite inherent differences 
and a lack of suitable docking mechanisms. The two OHQs’ proximity has clearly facili-
tated this process, as has the international context and unity of efforts in the area, and the 
unique culture of maritime cooperation in general. However, many remarks in the inter-
views within both the EU and NATO note a deeper level of learning and even socializa-
tion that builds on decades of military cooperation between most European NATO 
members and EU member states. The EU and NATO have a shared organizational his-
tory, which has not only resulted in the establishment of standard operating procedures 
but also a common operational culture, at least in military contexts. Cooperation between 
the EU and NATO is, for example, significantly more advanced and institutionalized 
than cooperation between either organization and any of the independent deployers in 
the region.
The nature of informal arrangements developed between the two organizations also 
suggests that they are more than just manifestations of pragmatist ad hoc solutions or 
mere reactions to operational and tactical necessities. Instead, a process of institutional-
izing practices ‘through the backdoor’, that is, outside of formal cooperation agreements 
and far off the political arena, becomes manifest. Based on their experience of working 
with each other, staff within both the EU and NATO have developed shared practices that 
help them sideline the political blockage and institutional impasse that has determined 
the course of cooperation between the two organizations over years. The institutionaliza-
tion of the PSC–NAC blockage that can mainly (but not solely) be attributed to the 
Turkey–Cyprus issue, has been the single biggest foundation of robust bottom-up pro-
cesses of cooperation. The result of this dynamic comes close to a ‘unity of effort’ that is 
to compensate for the lack of a formal link or ‘unity of command’ that a Berlin Plus setup 
would provide. There is even a sense of Berlin Plus being applied ‘in essence’ but not ‘in 
form’, since many of these informal processes take very similar channels and build on 
the liaison arrangements installed in the context of Berlin Plus. It seems unlikely, how-
ever, that the links established informally will translate into substantial reforms of the 
Berlin Plus agreements that would render them a more functional tool for current and 
future scenarios of EU–NATO cooperation. Reconciliation of the Turkey–Cyprus issue 
would obviously change the situation overnight but this scenario is currently still unlikely. 
There is reason to assume that for any major formal changes to take place that would 
even override political blockage, the EU and NATO would have to be faced with an 
imperative to pool forces in a belligerent high-intensity scenario. Libya could have been 
such a case but neither Kosovo nor Afghanistan has so far created this sort of pressure for 
the organizations to cooperate fully and without artificial institutional limitations.
Lessons learned and best practices developed in the context of counter-piracy are nev-
ertheless significant for the way EU–NATO cooperation has developed. More than in any 
other operational context, it has become clear that the relationship between the EU and 
NATO is no longer primarily determined by competition. The links, commonalities and 
affinities between the two organizations are stronger than the political divide and formal 
deadlock would suggest. It has been argued that the piracy problem in the region provides 
for a unique operational context that only masks competition in that the challenge seems 
large enough to allow for the concurrent presence of several organizations. The 
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geographical stretch and the nature and magnitude of the problem are indeed such that if 
one of the organizations were to leave, the forces of either side would struggle to cope on 
their own. Another practical aspect that in turn weakens the argument of competition and 
duplication is that the presence of two organizations also comes with the advantage that 
contributors have a better choice of organizational frameworks, which gets more third 
countries involved than if, for example, the EU was the only organization in place.
The case of counter-piracy has also quite clearly established a scenario of EU–NATO 
cooperation that has so far only been discussed in the context of civilian crisis manage-
ment: the idea of a ‘Berlin Plus in reverse’ has become very real with the EU running a 
more resourced and comprehensive operation that NATO seems to complement rather 
than lead both in terms of its military capabilities and also in terms of its strategic capaci-
ties. While the clear unity of effort might weaken any argument of competition or hierar-
chy between the two organizations, it has transpired from the interviews that this kind of 
functional primacy of ‘Atalanta’ is real to the extent that were the operations to integrate, 
the EU operation would be more likely to take the lead. However, it is unlikely that these 
experiences will translate into a political decision to recalibrate EU–NATO cooperation. 
National interests in keeping the status quo of EU–NATO cooperation will not cede 
before a real test case arises.
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Notes
 1. The number of attacks started to decline only after the second half of 2012, with a drop from 
176 incidences in 2011 to 47 in 2012 and 5 incidences by April 2013 (ICC International 
Maritime Bureau, 2013). 
 2. Similar developments have previously been reported for other cases, such as in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan (e.g. Grevi et al., 2009; Smith, 2011), where the EU and NATO also occupied 
the same operational space without any formal framework for cooperation. The difference 
between those cases and the specific case of counter-piracy lies in the fact that the two organi-
zations are not only operating in parallel in the same region, but they also fulfil largely similar 
mandates. In that respect, this particular case is more similar to the way EU–NATO interac-
tion was handled in Darfur in 2005 (see Reichard, 2006).
 3. Turkey therefore blocked any decisions within NATO that would help CSDP to become more 
autonomous. Turkish aspirations for EU membership exacerbated the problem as Turkey 
started to use the NATO–CSDP issue to condition the course of its accession process. Turkey 
reportedly blocked the Berlin Plus process on this basis for more than two years (1999–2002) 
(see e.g. Howorth, 2009).
 4. After leaving PfP in 1996 due to concerns over its national security, Malta rejoined the pro-
gramme in April 2008. Meanwhile, Cyprus remains the only EU member state that has not 
signed or ratified a security agreement with NATO.
 5. Malta also could not participate in formal EU–NATO meetings until it signed a security 
agreement with NATO in 2008.
 6. Despite there being a general tendency in both the academic and the political debate of focus-
ing on and conceiving of Berlin Plus mainly as a kind of rental contract that regulates EU 
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access to NATO assets and capabilities, and command and control structures in particular, 
it is important for this study to consider Berlin Plus in its entirety. As this article will come 
to show, some elements of Berlin Plus, such as the creation of permanent coordination and 
liaison structures between the two organizations, helped to facilitate informal coordination 
in counter-piracy without there having been a political consensus to formally activate it as a 
framework (see also note 14 ).
 7. This begs the question under what circumstances Berlin Plus was rejected as the preferred 
mechanism. When asked about the process, one very senior NATO official responded, ‘the 
only time we talked about that was for “Atalanta” and it did not really go anywhere. Why 
even think about doing it if you know that when it gets into the PSC it will just be blocked. 
Under the current climate no one is going to do that because they know it would never work’ 
(interview with senior NATO official at SHAPE, August 2010).
 8. In March 2012, the EU extended the mandate of NAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ to include air strikes up 
to two kilometres in land, yet still ruling out the option of getting ‘boots on the ground’ (EU 
NAVFOR, n.d.).
 9. It is interesting to note that at the purely military/operation level, the EU’s commitment to the 
WFP is, as one NATO Commander stated it, ‘drawing the short straw’. The mission they are 
doing, ‘although a great mission to deliver food to Somalia, but to use a billion dollar war-
ships to do it is really not a great mission for the military’ (interview with NATO official at 
Northwood OHQ, April 2010).
10. In the chain of command of the EU, for example, the operational and tactical levels are more 
closely linked to the political level, that is, the PSC and the HR, than within NATO. This not 
only implies that the strategic level of the EU is more responsive but also that operational and 
even tactical matters tend to become politicized more easily within the EU chain of command. 
NATO operational and tactical levels in turn have more leeway as to what can be done in 
theatre (interview with EU official at Northwood OHQ, April 2010).
11. At the time of writing, there have been five informal PSC–NAC meetings, with all NATO 
and EU members present including Cyprus, but none have discussed issues relating to 
counter-piracy.
12. For additional literature on Command and Control, please see Alberts and Hayes (2006) and 
Alberts (2007, 2010).
13. From an EU perspective and with regard to agreements originating from the PSC, one must 
distinguish between the cooperative relationship with third contributors in general, that is, 
independent deployers, and contributing states that are NATO-members but non-EU, such as 
Canada. Because the EU is more restrictive when it comes to the involvement of third con-
tributors and because of the political intricacies surrounding the Cyprus–Turkey issue, these 
countries rather choose to contribute to ‘Ocean Shield’ than to ‘Atalanta’ (interview with 
Senior Official at NATO HQ Operations, April 2011).
14. For additional literature on intelligence-sharing, please see Svendsen (2008) and Lefebvre 
(2003).
15. ‘This delineation between information and intelligence is an interesting one in that its raw 
data that come into this HQ, and we take a very pragmatic approach to that. As soon as some 
analysis has gone into that and therefore it carries an EU caveat, that puts us very much on the 
tightrope’ (interview with EU official at Northwood OHQ, April 2010).
16. In the case of the EU, this effect is particularly strong because of the nature of its chain of 
command: given that the political and operational levels are more tightly linked to each other, 
the political level, that is, the PSC, tends to be more responsive towards input coming from 
the operational and even tactical levels than it is the case with NATO and the NAC (see also 
note 7).
 at University of Bath - The Library on November 2, 2015cac.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
124 Cooperation and Conflict 50(1)
17. Interviews with a broad range of staff within both organizations suggest that this kind of 
attitude can vary considerably depending on personalities but also on the level of experience 
of staff with the underlying knowledge of the inter-organizational realities: there is a clear 
indication that staff become more keen to push the envelope the longer they are faced with the 
practical limitations. It also transpires that military staff are more likely to challenge formal 
arrangements than policy officers.
18. This bottom-up push effect goes well beyond the issue of facilitating EU–NATO cooperation 
in the absence of a political agreement. International staff working at the operational levels 
have, for example, also pushed for a formalization of the way the EU works with independent 
deployers. In the context of ‘Atalanta’ there has been a ‘challenge to the institutional norms’ 
of the EU (interview with EU official at Northwood OHQ, April 2010), not only with regards 
to the cooperation with NATO, but also in terms of how the EU can cooperate with Russia, 
China, Japan and other independent deployers. In the absence of cooperation to date and 
given the operational necessities transpired by staff at the operational level, the PSC agreed 
on 10 ‘cooperative frameworks’ that set out the procedures for EU cooperation with these 
countries in the area of operations.
19. This is where a more comprehensive view on the Berlin Plus agreements is necessary: the 
inter-organizational arrangements that were agreed in the context of Berlin Plus in 2003 
included a specific EU-related institutional mandate for the DSACEUR, stating that he would 
take on a general coordinating role at the military-strategic level that is not limited to Berlin 
Plus operations (see also note 3).
20. ‘On the other operations, and the areas of major cooperation outside of that (Berlin Plus), 
counter-piracy for example, what one does there is try to facilitate the passage of sensitive 
information. It is quite difficult because one cannot be seen to be doing it too formally’ (inter-
view with senior NATO official at SHAPE, August 2010).
21. ‘I don’t think we have had a ship taken out of the convoy yet’ (interview with NATO official 
at Northwood OHQ, April 2010).
22. MPAs are a key asset in the fight against piracy, since they provide important support for 
forces at sea and on the ground. They fly through the IRTC and look for any small craft that 
are fishing, migrant smuggling from Somalia to Yemen, or pirating crafts. The aircraft also 
go into certain areas on the Somali coast to try and detour and disrupt pirates from leaving 
the coast. Once pirates are at sea, ‘MPAs are used to do a “see-and-avoid kind of tactic” 
and inform the merchant traffic’ (interview with NATO official at Northwood OHQ, April 
2010). 
23. ‘On many occasions, acts of piracy have been disrupted as a direct result of the exchange of 
information and coordination between MPAs and EU NAVFOR warships’ (EU NAVFOR 
Somalia, 2010). 
24. There was a NATO Strategic Review (June 2011) that considered the closure of Northwood as 
the alliance looked to reduce its maritime command centres from currently three (Northwood, 
Lisbon and Naples) to just one. Losing Northwood, where 2000 staff work, would not only 
have been a blow to Britain’s prestige within NATO but would also have had significant 
implications for EU–NATO cooperation in counter-piracy.
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